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Review Essay
On Lewis Sorley’s Westmoreland:  
The General Who Lost Vietnam
GreGory A. DADDis
Studying the individual commander’s role in war has been a staple of military history since Homer’s epic the 
Iliad. Biographies of Julius Caesar, Frederick the Great, 
and Napoleon have long enticed audiences with explora-
tions of how great captains won or lost battles, and thus 
wars, in near single-handed fashion. Good biographies, of 
course, must be written with balance in mind. Events, and 
the environments in which they unfold, shape individu-
als, influence decisions, and often circumscribe actions. 
Context matters. Of writing biographies, John Lewis 
Gaddis observes that “it’s a little like riding a unicycle: you 
need to be aware all the time of a wider horizon, even as 
you concentrate on the single problematic point at which 
the rubber meets the road.”1 Gaddis’s point is significant 
for it helps explain the ultimate disappointment with 
Lewis Sorley’s new biography on William C. Westmoreland. In losing sight of 
the wider horizon, Dr. Sorley has reduced the history of the Vietnam War into a 
competition over the merits of two individual commanders, one of whom, in his 
view, won the war, the other who lost it.2
Certainly, the purpose of this new biography is well-founded as Sorley 
argues that until we understand Westmoreland, “we will never understand fully 
what happened to us in Vietnam, or why.”3 Philosophically, this work is an 
effort to keep the individual at the center of the Vietnam War, especially during 
the crucial years of American military escalation from 1964 to 1968. Sorley 
tells a tragic tale in which one man, fueled by ambition and promoted above his 
abilities, lost the war in Vietnam and then spent his remaining days absorbed 
in sad attempts to defend his record while leading the US Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV). 
While there is much to debate philosophically over the contention that 
individuals win or lose modern wars, methodological problems eventually derail 
Sorley from offering a fuller understanding of the Vietnam War. In focusing nar-
rowly on Westmoreland, Sorley omits crucial elements of the conflict’s history, 
especially those at cross-purposes with his thesis that Westmoreland’s inability 
to understand the war had “gravely damaged” American efforts in Southeast 
Asia.4 Rather than evaluate the relationships between the political, strategic, and 
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tactical levels—which Colin S. Gray notes are “not so neatly hierarchical”—
Sorley instead concentrates on Westmoreland as a failed military commander.5 
At times, this is useful, for the MACV chief played a significant role in the intro-
duction of American ground forces to Vietnam, and, more importantly, in how 
they were employed against both regular formations of the North Vietnamese 
Army (NVA) and irregular forces of the southern National Liberation Front 
(NLF). Westmoreland’s role in shaping an ultimately unsuccessful strategy in 
Vietnam is worth exploring.
It is thus tempting to view Westmoreland as a tragic figure and early on 
Sorley establishes his antihero as a paragon of military excellence. The former 
West Point first captain excelled as a battalion commander in World War II—his 
field artillerymen nicknamed him “Superman.” He later gained wide respect 
commanding a parachute infantry regiment, while subsequent commendable 
service in the Pentagon and as commander of the 101st Airborne Division 
marked Westmoreland as a rising star who found patronage from senior officers 
like Maxwell Taylor. Assignments as a student at Harvard Business School and 
as Superintendent of the US Military Academy served to enhance the develop-
ment of a leader whose “concern for the well-being of his soldiers was genuine 
and almost without limit.”6 Marriage to Katherine “Kitsy” Van Deusen equally 
helped “humanize” a formal, if not humorless, general. Westmoreland’s profes-
sional maturation, therefore, suggested an officer well-suited for higher levels 
of responsibility.
In reality, Sorley employs the chronicling of Westmoreland’s rise to 
MACV command as an artifice for bolstering his allegation of a man promoted 
beyond his means. For instance, a former aide-de-camp, interviewed in 2006, 
judged division command to be Westmoreland’s best role. (Similar condem-
nations come mainly from interviews Sorley conducted in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, raising questions about the veracity of selective oral histories and 
how soldiers remember war.)7 For the remainder of the work, Sorley presents 
his subject as fueled by ambition, ignorant of revolutionary warfare—as well 
as his personal limitations—and presiding over a strategy which doomed the 
United States to failure. Little room is made for countervailing views, such as 
those from General Bruce Palmer Jr. who recalled Westmoreland as “thought-
ful, sensitive, and very shrewd.”8 In a bit of irony, Sorley notes that en route to 
Vietnam in mid-1964, the presumptive MACV commander received “plenty of 
advice,” with one retired officer warning him not to be made “a scapegoat for a 
situation for which there may be no solution.”9 In this narrative, a scapegoat is 
exactly what Westmoreland becomes.
Central to caricaturing Westmoreland as a man promoted above his abil-
ity is Sorley’s tendentious rendering of American strategy in Vietnam: given 
wide latitude in determining how to run the war, Westmoreland independently 
developed a campaign plan centered on killing the enemy at the expense of all 
other missions. Such an account, however, fails to acknowledge not only the 
compartmentalized nature of the war in which the ground campaign was but one 
part of a larger whole, but also the concurrence of Westmoreland’s superiors. 
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Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief Pacific, considered MACV 
strategy to be “both well conceived and entirely appropriate to the ground-battle 
conditions under which [Westmoreland] was compelled to fight.”10 National 
security advisor McGeorge Bundy equally wrote to President Lyndon B. Johnson 
in early 1965 that the MACV commander and his subordinates, though thinking 
first of military programs, had been “imaginative and understanding about the 
importance of other aspects.”11 Rather than exploring the complexities of creat-
ing and implementing a strategy for a complex war, Sorley instead relies on the 
well-worn tropes of “attrition” and “search-and-destroy.” Recent scholarship 
suggests more work is to be done here, as evidenced by Eric Bergerud’s conten-
tion that such labels are unsatisfactory.12 In reality, Sorley leaves much out of 
these important chapters on Westmoreland’s role in Vietnam. He evades how 
enemy activities influenced the development of US strategy and fails to detail 
the nonmilitary aspects of Westmoreland’s three-phase concept of operations. 
A more careful review of archival material evokes an officer who understood 
the political-military interrelationships of the war in Vietnam. “Probably the 
fundamental issue is the question of the coordination of mission activities in 
Saigon,” the MACV commander opined in early 1966. “It is abundantly clear 
that all political, military, economic, and security (police) programs must be 
completely integrated in order to attain any kind of success in a country which 
has been greatly weakened by prolonged conflict and is under increasing pres-
sure by large military and subversive forces.”13 Far from being an officer ignorant 
of unconventional warfare, Westmoreland considered the issues of land reform, 
improving the South Vietnamese armed forces, limiting civilian casualties, and 
facilitating country-wide population security essential objectives.14
Sorley further dismisses the fact that policymakers and military com-
manders negotiated strategy in Vietnam throughout the war. Determined to paint 
Westmoreland as a military dullard, Sorley makes little mention of American 
pacification efforts from 1964-1968. In what only can be described as willful 
omission, the author ignores completely the Civil Operations and Revolutionary 
Development Support (CORDS) program. CORDS represented the single most 
important managerial innovation during the war and Westmoreland’s support 
played a decisive role in the organization’s inception and survival.15 MACV’s 
chief placed command emphasis on revolutionary development and civic action 
programs and noted in his strategic guidance for 1967 that the pacification effort 
should “properly dovetail the military and civil programs.”16 Sorley, however, 
turns a blind eye to this and, worse, to his own experiences. In November 1967, 
then Major Sorley published an article in Military Review on revolutionary devel-
opment and community-level programs which, while “Vietnamese in concept 
and execution,” were being “supported and encouraged by the United States.”17 
Such awkward truths, however, receive no attention in Sorley’s biography.
Instead, in this account, Westmoreland missed an opportunity to recon-
sider his misguided strategy by shelving the 1966 report titled, “A Program for the 
Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam” (PROVN). Sorley, 
though, does not tackle Andrew Birtle’s counterargument that there “was much 
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less disagreement between Westmoreland and the study’s authors than many 
commentators have implied.”18 Alternatively, the focus remains on body counts, 
inflating progress reports, and deceptively miscalculating enemy numbers. This 
“order of battle” controversy would lead Westmoreland to a defamation lawsuit 
against CBS News in the early 1980s and continues to offer worthwhile insight 
into the difficulties of assessing the differences between enemy main force units, 
self-defense forces, and part-time guerrillas. Sorley, however, prefers to use the 
controversy for exposing Westmoreland’s character flaws. A general, under 
pressure to report progress, lied about enemy strength to make the war effort 
look better. If this charge was fully true, there would have been a conspiracy of 
great magnitude involving West Point classmates Creighton Abrams and Bruce 
Palmer. If the MACV commander was lying about the enemy’s order of battle, 
why did not one of his peers publicly expose the deceit?19
The reader is left with an equally disingenuous accounting of West-
moreland’s relationship with the South Vietnamese army (ARVN). Sorley 
employs a chapter on M16 rifles to “definitively” illustrate “Westmoreland’s 
neglect of the South Vietnamese armed forces.” He argues that MACV’s indif-
ference towards ARVN’s improvement and modernization resulted in “wasted 
years” when the “South Vietnamese could have been developing in terms 
of leadership, combat operations experience, and skill in the use of modern 
weaponry.”20 As with so much in this biography, obscuration of contradictory 
evidence lies at the heart of such a contention. For example, Sorley neglects the 
work of Robert K. Brigham who argues persuasively that many ARVN soldiers 
“were ambivalent about service in the army because of the lack of proper ideo-
logical training and the recognition that the RVN was not a legitimate political 
entity with a cultural or historical precedent in Vietnam, two requirements for 
a viable future.”21 Sorley also conveniently avoids the 1967 creation of mobile 
advisory teams, a concept which, according to the official army historian on 
ARVN training, was “hailed as the turning point in improving the effectiveness 
of the territorial forces.”22 Similar to the order of battle controversy, MACV’s 
conception and implementation of ARVN training and modernization programs 
remains relevant for contemporary officers. Such officers, though, should be 
wary of Sorley’s partial accounting.
The ARVN, in fact, all but disappears from the biography during the 
climactic 1968 Tet offensive. So do all Vietnamese. Sorley takes no notice 
of the enemy’s strategy on the eve of Tet—or in the rest of the work, leaving 
Westmoreland fighting a vague apparition which only rarely forms into discern-
ible view.23 ARVN generals are employed simply to demonstrate that Tet had 
surprised Westmoreland. Left unmentioned is how the strain of American esca-
lation shaped Hanoi’s strategic conceptions in mid-1967 and helped instigate the 
early 1968 offensive. So, too, is the political and military aftermath, the role of 
ARVN, and how Creighton Abrams profited from NLF reversals during Tet. 
Journalist Peter Braestrup offered a more balanced treatment as early as 1969. 
“When he left Saigon last June, Westmoreland bequeathed to Abrams an appar-
ently weakened foe, a vast logistics network to give U.S. forces mobility and 
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firepower, and a growing South Vietnamese Army which, to the private surprise 
of its own leaders, had held up rather well at Tet.”24According to Sorley, when 
Westmoreland did leave Vietnam in 1968, he did so as a man preoccupied with 
salvaging his own reputation. Instead of focusing on the myriad duties of the 
army’s chief of staff, Westmoreland crossed the country justifying his actions 
to a war-weary public. In this telling, Richard Nixon, seeing the failed com-
mander as a political liability, never once solicited the general’s views as the war 
in Vietnam wound down. Recently declassified documents suggest otherwise. 
National security advisor Henry Kissinger actually sought Westmoreland’s 
counsel on the 1971 Laotian incursion and in early April personally called to 
apologize for not following it.25 Certainly, Westmoreland was not a key player in 
developing strategy during the war’s final years. Yet to dismiss his post-Vietnam 
life as nothing more than “miserable” seems an unfair oversimplification.26 
In the end, Sorley’s biography stands as an incomplete view of West-
moreland and thus of the Vietnam War. Westmoreland certainly was a flawed 
man, but his biographer’s refusal to confront countervailing arguments suggests 
an underlying agenda aimed at condemning one general in order to lionize 
another.27 By painting William Westmoreland as duplicitous, conniving, and 
self-promotional at all costs, Sorley can strengthen his own past work arguing 
that Creighton Abrams had fought a better war. In the process, however, this 
partisan work languishes in overly reductive analysis. 
There is, of course, much to learn about how a senior American officer 
dealt with the war in Vietnam during the mid-1960s, but Sorley’s preoccupa-
tion with bolstering Abrams at Westmoreland’s expense is both misleading 
and mean-spirited. Individuals do matter but so too does context. No single 
individual, not even Ho Chi Minh, should be saddled with the sole blame for 
either the causes or outcome of such a complex war as Vietnam. As John Lewis 
Gaddis warned in The Landscape of History, it is somewhat “irresponsible to 
seek to isolate . . . single causes for complex events.”28 Philosophically, readers 
of this work should consider how much impact individual generals can have 
in determining the outcome of modern wars. Methodologically, those same 
readers should contemplate how history can change depending on what gets left 
out of the story. If Creighton Abrams deserved a better war, certainly William 
Westmoreland deserves a more complete biography.
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